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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
'·· .. 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELBERT G. BENNET'T and 
1\fARJORIE C. BENNETT', 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ARNOLD DEE W!-IITE and 
ERMA M. WHITE, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
GENERAL INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Pla~""ntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ELBERT G. BENNETT' and 
MARJORIE C. BENNE,TT, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9633 
BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENTS 
NATURE OF T'HE CASE 
In this brief the plaintiffs below will be referred to 
as "appellants" or "Bennetts" and the defendants below 
will be referred to as ''respondents'' or ''Whites." This 
suit was brought by the appellants against the respond-
ents for rescision of a construction contract upon the 
grounds of fraud. The appellants alleged, firstly, that 
the respondent White obtained the appellant's signa-
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ture to the building contract upon the false representa-
tion that he would complete the construction, whereas 
he had no intention of doing so. Appellants alleged, sec-
ondly, that respondent White fraudulently represented 
that he would carry the contract for 4 years. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The respondents moved for dismissal of the com-
plaint upon the grounds that it did not state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted, and this motion was 
allowed. The appellants filed an amended complaint, 
which in the opinion of respondents alleged nothing sig-
nificantly different from the ·original complaint which 
had been dismissed by the court. A different judge of 
the district court denied respondent's motion to dismiss 
this complaint and the matter thereafter proceeded to 
trial before an advisory jury. The court submitted three 
special interrogatories to the jury (R. 109), the answers 
to which were not helpful to the court in arriving at a 
determination of the issues of the case. They certainly 
did not warrant or justify a finding of fraud, and the 
court so ruled. 
In any event, respondents filed a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and the court there-
after filed a memorandum decision (R 115-119) in which 
he reas·oned and concluded that the allegations of fraud 
had not been established by clear and convincing evi-
dence and thereafter his decree dismissing the complaint 
and granting judgment of no cause of action in favor 
of the respondents was entered. The appellants made a 
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motion for a new trial, which was denied; and this ap-
peal was instituted to reverse the decision of the lower 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, the appellants seek to obtain the 
reversal of the judgment of the lower court in favor of 
the respondents no cause of action and dismissing the 
complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are not satisfied with the staten1ent 
of facts set forth in appellants' brief, for the reasons 
that the statement is not complete and appellants so 
called state1nent of facts is so colored and intermingled 
with argument that it is difficult to separate that which 
is factual from that which is argumentative. Inasmuch 
as we take the position that there are no facts in the 
record which either indicate or establish fraud, it is rath-
er difficult to select from the record the facts which will 
assist the court most in reviewing this matter. 
The facts in this case show that on or about July 
1, 1960, the Bennetts and the Whites entered into a 
contract whereby \Vhites agreed to sell a home, there-
after to be constructed, to Bennetts for the sum of 
$30,975.00 (Ex. 6-D, 168-70). Just previous to the con-
tract, the Bennetts had selected the plan which was used 
in the construction of the home. The contract recited a 
down payment of $2,000.00 which was paid in the form 
of a check. (Ex. 2-D, R 171). The house was completed 
within about 90 days, except for very minor details (R 
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180). During the construction .M:rs. Bennett came on the 
j'Oh about every day (R 347). Several changes were made 
in the home but all of them were with the full knowl-
edge and consent of the Bennetts (R 162-163). There 
were many changes made in the plans which increased 
the cost to the respondents, and this cost was not passed 
on to the appellants. The lighting fixtures exceeded the 
rulowance made for them by $228.00 (Ex. 5-D); and there 
were a lot ·of extras not included in Exhibit 5-D (R 206). 
Mrs. Bennett wanted a stairway identical to another 
existing stairway which was duplicated for her. However, 
after installation it did not suit her exactly and was 
taken out at considerable expense (R 207). The specifi-
cations called for rock installation to mantle height, but 
respondents installed the rock all the way to the ceiling 
at considerable cost and this expense was not passed 
on to the Bennetts. :h1:rs. Bennett kept the painters be-
wildered by changing her mind with respect to paint 
work. There were four or five coats of paint in many 
parts of the house, both inside and out, where only three 
coats were specified. No extra charge was made for this. 
A larger furnace than the one specified was installed in 
the house and no extra charge was passed on to the Ben-
netts (R 208). Respondents were charged $80.00 extra 
for electrical outlets requested by the appellants (R 
320). Whereas the light fixtures called for $125.00 allow-
ance, $353.25 was actually spent, notwithstanding the 
fact that Mrs. Bennett had told Mr. White that there 
had been no exceeding of the allowance for light fixtures. 
Mrs.. Bennett chose a range that cost $70.00 more than 
the one ordinarily used (R 120). No extra charge was 
made for these items. 
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The respondents had a conference with the appel-
lants just prior to the signing of the final contract dated 
October 25, 1960 (Ex. 3-P) with respect to changes in 
construction and extras. In this conference White listed 
certain items showing a debit for extras and other items 
showing a credit to appellants for variations from the 
plan which reduced the cost (Ex. 5-D, R 186-187). The 
difference between the credits and debits was added to 
the purchase price and reflected in the October 25, 1960, 
contract (Ex. 3-P, R-211). The Bennetts entered into 
possession on or about October 23 or October 24, 1960, 
at which time the house was completed except for very 
minor details (R 180). Bennett was a graduate of the 
University of Utah Law School and was a law clerk 
for the firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & :McCarthy 
at the time he signed both the original contract during 
the latter part of June, 1960, and the final contract on 
October 25, 1960 (R 288). Mr. Bennett examined Exhibit 
6-D before he signed it, and he knew what was in it (R 
289). He examined the typewritten provisions of the 
contract before signing it and understood the purchase 
price and was not misled about it (R 290) .. He under-
stood the teTms of payment written into the contract 
(R 290) and the agreement to refinance within a four-
year period from date (Ex. 6-D). The latter provision 
followed a discussion with White in which White indi-
cated a willingness to carry Bennetts for four years 
to have his equity paid back (R 293). Bennett under-
stood, both as a buyer and as a lawyer, that under the 
wording of the contract White could not require him 
to refinance for four years (R 293). There was no dis-
pute as to the purchase price appearing on Exhibit 3-P, 
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the agreement of October 25, 1960 (R 301). Bennett con-
sidered the contract to be fair after the house was com-
pleted ( R 302). The terms of payments set forth in 
Exhibit 3-P seemed fair and proper to him and he under-
stood them (R 303). 
With respect to the claimed misrepresentation by 
White that he would not assign the contract, Bennett 
admitted that White had not said anything about 
not assigning - ''He just said, 'I am carrying it for 
four years.'" (305). Bennett could not recall White's 
ever saying that he would not assign the contract (R 
306). During the course of construction, a wooden floor 
had been substituted for the cement one and this change 
was discussed with the Bennetts before the installation 
was made (R 212). In order to have put a concrete slab 
it would have necessitated fourteen feet of fill dirt which 
would have cost thousands of dollars to install. This 
was determined within about a week of commencement 
of construction and was discussed with the Bennetts at 
that time. At the time White met with the Bennetts, prior 
to the signing of the Octo her 25, 1960 contract, the 
wooden floor was in place and was not raised as an issue. 
No extra charge was made for the floor and no offset 
was claimed by the Bennetts. (R. 214). At the time of 
signing the final contract there was no discussion at all 
and no representation that Mr. White would continue 
to hold the contract and not assign it. The contract itself 
in paragraph 3 (Ex. 3-P) provides that the purchase 
price- shall be- payable - ''at the office of seller, his 
assigns, or order" (R 216). There was no statement 
made at the time the contract was signed to the effect 
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that White would give a moratorium with respect to 
payments (R 216). The payment provisions appearing 
on Exhibit 3-D were discussed and arranged for the con-
venience of the Bennetts. (R 217). The home had all 
of its appropriate inspections; its framing inspection 
by the city Mechanical Department; its electrical inspec-
tion by the Electrical Department of the city; and its 
plumbing inspection by the Plumbing Department of 
the city (R 219). After taking possessi'on, the Bennetts 
made a complaint to the State Contractors Department 
which resulted in a hearing attended by the Bennetts 
and the Whites. As a result of this hearing, the Con-
tractors Department wrote a letter to Mr. White on 
:November 18, 1960, (Ex. 8-D) specifying certain items 
that should be taken care of. Immediately upon receiv-
ing this letter, vVhite ·organized his forces to make the 
corrections and all these corrections were made (R 222-
223). A former Veterans Administration and F.H.A. 
Inspector, testifying for the appellants, admitted that 
the workmanship of the house was average or a little 
above; that he could see nothing wrong with the mate-
rial; that the kitchen cabinets installed were average 
or above (R 246) ; that the paint job was average (R 
249). Mr. White remembered that during the course of 
the visit of the inspectors from the state at the house 
that he told the Bennetts that the things recommended 
by the inspector would be done. (R 257). The Bennetts 
moved out of the house about N ovemher 25, 1960 (R 
311) and thereafter served upon the respondents notice 
of rescision of the contract (Ex. 4-P). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHI:CH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
The basic elements ·of fraud under the previous de-
cisions of this court are (1) a representation, (2) that 
is false, ( 3) and rna terial, ( 4) known by the speaker to 
be false, ( 5) and made with the intent that it should be 
acted upon in the manner reasonably contemplated ( 6) 
the heare,r ignorant of its falsity, (7) relying upon its 
truth, ( 8) and has a right reasonably to rely thereon, 
(9) to his injury. See Struck vs. Delta Land and Water 
Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791-795. 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Southern Development Company vs. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 
8 S. Ct. 881, 31 L.Ed. 678, holds similarly: 
''In order to establish a charge of this char-
acter (fraud) the complaintant must show by 
clear and decisive proof first, that the defend-
ant has made a representation in regard to a ma-
terial fact; secondly, that such representation 
is false; thirdly, that such representation was 
actually believed by the defendant on reasonable 
grounds to be true; fourthly, that it was made 
with the intent that it should be acted on; fifthly, 
that it was acted on by complainant to his dam-
age ; and sixthly, that in so acting on it the com-
plainant was ignorant of its falsity and reason-
ably believed it to be true ... 
"It is also well settled that the fraud involved 
must relate to facts that exist or which have pre-
viously existed. 12 R. C.L. 254, Annotation 51, 
A.L.R. p. 49." 
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See also Oberg 'VS. Sanders 111 Utah 507, 184 Pac. 
2d. 229, Campbell vs. Zions Co-op Home Co., 46 Utah 1, 
148 P. 401, Ackerman vs. Bramwell, 80 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 
623. 
A promise to do s·omething in the future does not 
involve a presently existing fact, and the allegations 
of fraud in this case have reference to the promise of 
the respondents to do something or refrain from doing 
something in the future. Secondly, the appellants must 
have reasonably relied upon the false misrepresentation. 
It is difficult for respondents to conceive ·of a situation 
where a party entering into a contract, which by its 
terms provides that it may be assigned and by its terms 
calls for specific payments with a specific grace period, 
can reasonably rely upon representation about an in-
definite grace period or moratorium. If the parties were 
talking about a different grace period such as the indefi-
nite moratorium which appellants allege, they had full 
opportunity to incorporate provisions to this effect in 
the contract. It hardly seems reasonable for appellants 
to say that the contract provided one thing, which was 
very clear to them, but they relied upon the seller to 
do something altogether different, if in the indefinite 
future they might be unable to make a payment. This 
appears to be a plain, unadulterated attempt to vary the 
clear unambiguous terms of a written instrument by 
parole evidence. 
We desire to call the court's attention to the fol-
lowing statement in Wigmore on Emdenoe, 2d Ed. ·§ 2430: 
"Since the amount, time and manner of pay-
ment is dealt with by the writing, the intent of 
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the parties to incorporate therein all that element 
of the oral negotiation would ordinarily be con-
clusively presumed." 
The previous negotiations of the parties with re-
spect to assignability of the contract and with respect 
to the method of payment and period of grace were in-
corporated and resolved in the clear terms of the writ-
ten instrument. See 111itchess vs. Lott (N.Y.) 160 N.E. 
646, Higgs vs. deMaziroff (N.Y.) 189 N.E. 355. 
Damage is another essential element of actionable 
fraud. There is no allegation in the amended complaint 
which reasonably disclosed that the buyers were dam-
aged by reason of the failure of the sellers to retain 
their interest as sellers in the contract. They were not 
damaged by assignment of the contract because the as-
signee was under the same obligations to perform as the 
respondents. l\1:oreover, the appellants served a notice 
of rescision before the first payment was due and it 
would have to be assumed or presumed that the assignee 
would be less considerate and less charitable than the 
seller in order that the appellants nright have been in-
jured by the alleged fraudulent promise not to assign 
the contract. The appellants cannot say that they suf-
fered damage because the respondents assigned the con-
tract and deprived the1nselves of the power to grant an 
indefinite moratorium if son1etime in the future appel-
lants defaulted. From all that appears in the allegations 
of the amended complaint, the assignees would have been 
just as lenient as the respondents. If the appellants' 
obligations could not be changed by the assignment, it 
must necessarily follow that the assignn1ent of the con-
10 
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tract could not cause legal damage or injury to the appel-
lants; and it is hard to understand how a misrepresenta-
tion could be either materially or actionably fraudulent 
if the appellants coud suffer no injury, even if it were 
false. 
There IS no allegation in the amended complaint 
that the improvements were not substantially completed. 
Not every breach of contract would constitute a ground 
for rescision before a partial failure of performance of 
·one party will give the other the right of rescision. The 
failure of performance must go to the root of the con-
tract. 9 Am. J ur. § 78, p. 1020. 
In the second count, the appellants allege mutual 
mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract resulting 
from the fraud of respondents in making the same false 
representations alleged in the first count. Certainly, 
this count, too, must fall by its own weight, lacking the 
essential elements of fraud. 
POINT TWO 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND THE 
COURT'S FINDING TO THAT EFFECT WAS FULLY JUSTI-
FIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
So far as we are able to gather from the appellants' 
amended complaint and brief, they claim that the re-
spondents were guilty of fraud in two respects: (1) Re-
spondent falsely represented that he would carry the 
contract for four years and he had no intention of doing 
so. (2) Respondent induced the appellants to enter into 
the contract by falsely representing that he would com-
11 
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plete the construction of the home when he had no inten-
tion of doing so. We will consider these two proposi-
tions in order. In this case, the attitude of the respond-
ents appeal" from the evidence to have been more ap-
propriately classified as benevolent than fraudulent. The 
lot upon which the house was to be built by the respond-
ents was valued at $6,500. (R 2.55). The $2,000.00 down 
payment furnished by the appellants represented less 
than one-third of the value of the lot and yet the respond-
ents were willing to bear the financial burden of con-
structing the house upon this lot and to wait four years 
to recover baclt th~ir equity, while patiently requiring 
the appellants to pay only su£fieient monthly payments 
to keep the construction mortgage current. This proved 
to be foolishly generous on the part of the respondent; 
it certainly was not fraudulent. When the respondents 
assigned the eontract, they had to discount the contract 
to the extent of approximately $3,600.00 in order to pay 
the bills on the home that could not be covered by the 
mortgage money. But, of course, the respondents 
couldn't, nor would they attempt, to pass this problem 
on to the appellants, beeause under the contract re-
spondents were bound to wait four years before receiving 
payment of their equity. The statement that the respond-
ents would carry the appellants for a period of four 
years was promissory in nature and did not constitute 
the representation of an existing material fact. 
We are not unmindful of the holding of this oourt 
in the case of Hull vs. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, P. 2d 56, 
which involved the principle of misrepresentation of in-
tention or of state of mind. The case has no application 
12 
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here because respondent's fraudulent intention or state 
of mind was not established by any evidence. In the first 
place, the representation by White that he would carry 
the contract for four years was not false. The original 
contract (Ex. 6-D) recites a purchase price of $30,975.00 
with a downpayment of merely $2,000.00 and a monthly 
payment of the balance o-f $160.00 and the appellants 
admitted that this monthly payment would not pay the 
seller's equity back at all, inasmuch as $160.00 per month 
was required to meet the mortgage payments on the 
house. The payment provisions of the contract (Ex. 6-D) 
contain the following significant language: "In any event, 
buyer to refinance within a f·our-year period from date." 
It is clear that respondent's representation that he would 
carry the appellants for four years was given effect 
by this provision in the contract and Bennett admitted 
that he understood as a buyer and as a lawyer that under 
the wording of the contract, respondents would not re-
quire him to refinance for four years; and White would 
have to literally carry the appellants for that period of 
time without receiving any part of his equity. Now it 
is also undisputed in the evidence that because of changes 
made throughout the course of construction, which in 
some instances benefited the builder and in other in-
stances, the buyers, the parties sat down together and 
arrived at an adjustment of the purchase price of the 
property, which adjustment is evidenced in part by Ex-
hibit 5-D. 
This exhibit gives credit to the appellants for devia-
tions from the plan which benefited the respondents; 
and also sets forth charges made against the appellants 
13 
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for extras; and the final contract (Ex. 3-P) was pre-
pared to reflect this increase in price. Of course, there 
were many extras pointed out in our statement of facts 
that are not included in this adjustment and were al-
lowed by the respondents gratuitously. The terms of 
payment set forth in Exhibit 3-P, the final contract of 
October 25, 1960, seemed fair and proper to the appel-
lants and they understood them. The contract also con-
tained the provision : 
"Buyer agrees to refinance the above prop-
erty on or before October 25, 1964." 
When asked why that provision was put into the final 
contract, Mr. Bennett answered: 
"Yes, it was put in the original terms that 
it would be carried by Mr. White until the end 
of four years, at least four years." 
and this provision was made to give effect to the repre-
sentations made by Mr. White that he would carry his 
equity in the contract for four years before· requiring 
the appellants to refinance and pay him off (R 303-304). 
It is true that the appellants attempt by their brief to 
twist this representation into a promise that the respond-
ents would not assign the contract for four years. How-
ever, when asked directly if Mr. White had ever stated 
that he would not assign the contract, Bennett testified 
that: 
"White didn't say anything about assigning, 
he said 'I run carrying it for four years.'" (R 305) 
Bennett could not recall White's ever saying that 
he would not assign the contract (R 306). It would, there-
fore, appear that the only attempt at deceit in this case 
14 
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is the effort on the part of the appellants to distort a 
promise to wait f.or payment of an equity into a promise 
not to assign. Of course, if the distortion were allowed, 
the appellants would still fail because they never proved 
that White intended to lose $3,600.00 by assigning the 
original contract entered into July 1, 1960, and Bennett 
knew that he was negotiating for the assignment of the 
final contract entered into on October 25, 1960, at the 
time this contract was signed. Mr. Bennett, one of the 
appellants in this case, was a graduate lawyer, employed 
as a law clerk in a prominent law firm. He knew as a 
lawyer that he could not avoid his contract unlses he 
concocted this flimsy theory of fraud. Bennett examined 
the contract, understood all its provisions, particularly 
with reference to the method of payment and the 30-days 
grace allowed by the contract. He claims that White made 
some vague promise to give the appellants a mortatorium 
of some kind if in the, future, they might be unable to make 
a payment. He knew as a lawyer that even if such a 
statement had been made by the respondents, which they 
deny, that he could not reasonably rely upon such an 
indefinite promise and it is foolish for him now to claim 
that he was thereby induced to enter into the contract. 
As a lawyer, it is foolish for him to attempt to impose 
upon this court by saying that although the written in-
strument resolved the oral negotiations of the parties 
with respect to the grace period of 30 days, the parties 
intended a vague and indefinite mortatorium instead. If 
when he signed the contract, Mr. Bennett entertained 
the foolish expectation that he could enjoy all of the bene-
fits of the contract without honoring his own promise 
to make any of the payments, he was naive, indeed. As 
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heretofore pointed out, . the contract by its very terms 
mentions its assignability - the payments were to be 
made at the· office of seller, "his assigns, or order.'' (Ex .. 
hibit 6.-D'). 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the appellants 
suffered any damage by reason of the representation 
that respondents would carry them for four years. Even 
if such representation were twisted into meaning that 
they would not assign the contract, the appellants served 
notice of rescision and vacated the property before the 
first payment became due and they admitted that they 
were able to make· the first payment at that time. 
There was no evidence to show that the assignee 
of the contract would be less liberal or considerate than 
the respondents whom they now attempt to clothe in 
the evil garments of fraud. Injury n1ust be proved and 
not presumed. Of course, the record shows the express 
denial of White that he ever agreed not to assign the 
contract (R 216); and White testified that no statement 
was made at the time that the contract was signed with 
respect to giving moratorium (R 216). Such a claim 
now is in direct variance with the payment provision 
and the 30 days grace period specified in the contract; 
and the appellant as a layman, much less as a graduate 
lawyer, would have no right to rely upon it anyway. 
The claim that respondent induced the appellants 
to enter into the contract by simply representing that he 
would complete the construction of the home when he 
had no intention of doing so, is based on fantasy; not 
16 
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upon evidence. In the first place, at the time the appel-
lants and the respondents entered into the original con-
tract before the work was commenced on construction 
of the home and at which time the appellants paid the 
down payment - which was the only money they ever 
paid- White clearly intended to build a house as agreed. 
He 1nanifested this intention by virtually completing 
it within 90 days even though the appellants had re-
quested numerous changes, such as installing a stairway 
three times and putting on four or five coats of paint 
in an effort to please Mrs. Bennett. It would require 
a violent stretch of the imagination to say that White 
on July 1, 1960, did not intend to build a house to com-
pletion for the appellants and there is no evidence on the 
record from which such intention could possibly be in-
ferred. When the house was substantially completed, 
the respondents at the request of the appellants per-
mitted them to move in. When the respondents signed 
the final contract (Ex. 3-P), they were living in the 
house and they were simply adjusting the sales price 
to reflect the change for some of the extras which had 
been installed. The contract otherwise was identical to 
the first one. How can appellants reasonably say they 
'vere fraudulently induced to sign this final agreement 
when they fully understood all its terms and had con-
curred in them~ They claim, although they did not prove, 
that White made a promise he had no intention of per-
forming at the time he made it. White testified that he 
intended at all times to complete the house and he did 
in fact thereafter complete it (R 222-223, 361). 
17 
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The witness, Aae, testified that he heard Mrs. Ben-
nett say to ~1:r. White after the hearing at the Contractors 
Department held in November, that there was no use 
of doing anything more, and that was two weeks before 
Bennetts 1noved out. At that time the respondent was 
willing to go down and do all that ~1:rs. Bennett wanted 
done (R 354). The appellants altogether failed to prove 
a fraudulent intent of the respondents with respect to 
the compJ.etion of the house. Appellants claim that sever-
al days after representing that he would complete the 
house and several days after the October 25th contract 
was signed, White told ~1:rs. Bennett that he had finished 
the house as far as he was concerned and would do no 
more, and l\1:rs. Bennett further claimed that she was 
told if she wanted any more work done on the house 
she would have to sue him. The trial judge was not con-
vinced of the truth of this testimony and in his memo-
randum decision, he calls attention to the fact that cir-
cumstances developed after the singing which may have 
provoked White into making the statements attributed 
to him, even if appellants' version of the contract were 
believed. This would appear to be more evidence that 
White had changed his mind than proof of an incipient 
fraudulent intent. The trial judge had the opportunity 
of observing the appearance and demeanor of the wit-
nesses and the trial judge was convinced that vVhite 
was not a deceiver and a cheat. This court's attention 
is directed to the memorandum decision (R 115) in which 
the trial court announced the reason for its decision. 
There can be no doubt but what its decision and findings 
were based upon a fair preponderance of the evidence, 
and the appellants altogether failed at the trial to intro-
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duce clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and under 
the nu1nerous decisions of this court and by the great 
weight of authority, evidence of fraud warranting the 
rescision of a contract must be clear and convincing. 
J:Por example, see Chapman vs. Troy Laundry Company, 
87 Utah 15, 47 P.2d. p. 1054, 1065. Southern Development 
Company vs. Silva, sup·ra; Nielsen vs. Learrning·ton Mines 
and Exploration Corporation, 48 P. 2d 439. 
'rhe appellants grasp at the further straw that re-
spondent installed a wooden floor instead of a concrete 
floor as contemplated by the plans and specifications 
and they say that respondents lied when they promised 
to complete the house because they had no intention of 
installing the concrete floor. There is no merit to this 
contention. The substitution of the wooden floor for the 
concrete floor was discussed with the Bennetts before 
the substitution was made (R 212). This discussion took 
place long before the October 25th contract was ever 
signed. Without this change it would have been necessary 
to put a concrete slab upon fourteen feet of fill dirt. 
The witness, Aae, testified that the concrete floor could 
not have been safely built upon the fill dirt and that 
this was discussed with the Bennetts. It was, therefore, 
in the appellants' interest that these changes were made. 
Bennetts had been on the job frequently and were pres-
ent when the wooden floor was installed. This issue was 
not raised at the time the sales price· was adjusted by 
reason of the various changes in the plans. The Bennetts 
knew at the time they signed the contract on October 25, 
1960, that they had a wooden floor and that the respond-
ents had no intention of changing it to a concrete floor. 
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There was no proof that White at any time orally prom-
ised or represented that he would install a concrete floor 
in the basement. 
As was pointed out by the trial court in his memo-
randum decision, the mere failure to perform the work 
does not constitute evidence of an intent not to do it at 
the time the promise was made. As a matter of fact, a 
promisor for a good or bad reason may change his mind 
about the keeping of a promise within an hour after the 
promise is made and this would not constitute fraud. 
Of course, the appellant Bennett was schooled in 
the law and working in a law office, and he knew that 
he could not walk out on his contract without some proof 
of fraud. He was confronted with the impossible situa-
tion of discovering fraud which was non-existent. Even 
if the jury in this case believed that Mr. White refused 
to do the work several days after he had promised that 
it would be done, this is just as much evidence that he 
changed his mind as it is evidence that he didn't intend 
to keep the promise when he made it. We respectfully 
call this court's attention to the "Restatement of Torts," 
Section 530, from which we quote as follows : 
"On the other hand, one who acts or relies 
upon another's honest statement of his then exist-
ing intention, cannot maintain an action for the 
loss caused by the disappointment of his expec-
tations, if the other for any reason, good or bad, 
changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry 
his expressed intention into effect. If the recipient 
who is to o htain legal assurance honestly believes 
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that his intentions will be carried out, he must 
see that it is expressed in the form of an enforce-
able contract. (c) Proof Of Intention Not To Per-
form An Agreement. The intention which is nec-
essary to make the rule stated in this section is 
the intention of the performance when the agree-
ment was entered into. The intention of the per-
former not to perform an enforceable or unen-
forceable agreement cannot be established solely 
by proof of its non-performance, nor does his 
failure to perform the agreement throw upon him 
the burden of showing that the non-performance 
was due to reasons that occurred after the agree-
ment was entered into." 
In a hypothetical situation, a person can make a 
thoroughly honest and sincere promise on one day and 
the following day can change his mind for some reason 
or other. We have in the case at bar, a situation where 
the parties worked along agreeably under a contract for 
three months until the house was completed to a point 
where the buyer could take possession. At that time they 
even agreed without difficulty upon the credits which 
should be given for changes in the plans and specifica-
tions and for the increased amount which the appellant 
should pay for the extras performed. This agreement 
was shown by a written document in evidence. We sub-
mit that in all fairness this Court could not do equity 
between these parties by permitting the plaintiffs to walk 
out of this contract, even if it should have been made 
to appear from part of the evidence that a few things 
remained to be done when the appellants left. Certainly, 
all of these matters could be handled without difficulty 
and without great cost and the appellants had a full, ade-
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quate and complete. remedy at law. In order to be given 
the extraordinary relief of rescinding the contract, the 
burden was upon the appellants to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that they were the victims of fraud. 
Under the evidence they got everything they bargained 
for. 
POINT THREE 
EVEN IF THE OCTOBER 25, 1960 CONTRACT WERE 
RESCINDED, THE APPELLANTS WOULD STILL BE UN-
DER OBLIGATION TO PURCHASE THE HOUSE IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE EARLIER CON-
TRACT AS MODIFIED BY THE AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR 
EXTRAS. 
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs 
paid $2,000.00 prior to the execution of the July con-
tract and prior to the construction of the home. No fraud 
is attached to the negotiations and agreement when this 
Slun was paid. During the course of construction, the 
parties agreed on certain deviations from the plans and 
specifications which were resolved by oral agreement 
just prior to the signing of the modifying contract on 
October 25, 1960. Therefore, when the parties affixed 
their signatures to the 1nodifying agreement, the plain-
tiffs were already under obligation to purchase the house 
which was under construction and to pay for the extras 
in accordance with an oral agreen1ent which was sup-
ported by the 1nen1orandmn received in evidence. 
Even if the Court should rescind the October 25th 
nwdifying agreement, it would still leave the· parties 
in the position they were in immediately prior thereto. 
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vV e Jo not believe that the evidence justifies resClsiOn 
of the October 25th modifying agreement, but in any 
case, the court would not be doing equity in this mat-
ter if it attempted to do more than restore the parties 
to the position they were in when the agreement was 
signed. The plaintiffs did not part with any money on 
October 25, 1960. The parties simply incorporated into 
writing the modifications of the contract which had been 
previously orally agreed upon. 
Moreover, it does not appear clear to respondents 
how appellants can be said to have been induced to enter 
into the modifying contract by respondents' promise to 
do the work which respondents had already agreed to do 
as a part of the original construction agreement. Appel-
lants did not change their position and were not induced 
to change their position in any respect. Both parties were 
simply agreeing to do what they were already bound to 
do. If the contract was breached by any subsequent 
failures to comple·te the house, it was a simple matter 
for the appellants to have procured such completion and 
to have claimed credit on the contract for the cost of the 
same. This would give them a full and adequate remedy 
without leaving the Court with the necessity of speculat-
ing over the state of mind of the· respondents on October 
25, 1960, or about whether, against the great quantum 
of proof, the house was not substantially completed. 
POINT FOUR 
THE WORK PERFORMED BY 'THE RESPONDENTS 
OVER AND ABOVE THE CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS 
NEGATES IMPLICATIONS OF FRAUD OR DECEIT. 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There were many extras not included in Exhibit 
5-D. In addition to this, no inferior materials were used 
on the job. First class workmanship was put into the 
house. Where specifications called for 2 x 4 partitions, 
rsepondents put in 2 x 6's and whereas many contractors 
use 2 x 6 and 2 x 8 floor j<>ists, ·respondents installed 
2 x 10 floor joists (R 346). The building inspector, called 
by the appellants,, testified that the workmanship was 
average or above and that he could see nothing wrong 
with the materials, and that the kitchen cabinets were 
average or above. (R 245-246). 
We believe that the trial judge was fully justified 
by this evidence in finding and concluding that the re-
spondent White was not a person lilrely to perpBtrate 
fraud. The benevolent heart does not usually beat be-
neath the cloak of deceit. Mr. White's benevolence is 
further indicated by his willingness to sell the $30,000.00 
house to appellants with a $2,000.00 down payment and 
allowing them a minimum monthly payment for a period 
of four years. He n1ade available to them a lot valued at 
$6,500.00 so that the down payment represented less than 
one-third of the· lot price and White was required to pay 
several thousand dollars above the amount he could 
borrow to complete the house. Because of the financial 
stress which this placed him under, he was later required 
to assign the contract and discount it to the extent of 
approximately $3,600.00. His interest in being helpful 
to the appellants was expensive to him and although he 
1nay have been considered unwise from a financial stand-
point, it requires a violent stretch of the realities of 
the situation to find any aroma of fraud or deceit. It is 
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regrettable that the recipients of White's benevolence 
responded with irresponsible charges of fraud in a care-
fully planned effort to avoid a contract fully understood 
by the appellants, fairly framed, and fully performed 
by the respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the. various reasons set forth in this brief, and 
for many other reasons that may occur to this court 
in the thoughtful consideration of this matter, we respect-
fully urge this court to affirm the judgment heretofore 
entered by the district court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WIDTE, 
Attorney for Respondents 
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